Abstract: Differences in national intellectual property rules may cause economic activity to shift from one jurisdiction to another such that a higher protection rule in one jurisdiction will be undermined by lower protection rules in other jurisdictions. This article illustrates this phenomenon with four examples: as to rules on the enforceability of anti-reverse engineering clauses of software licenses, the protectability of bioengineered research tools, peer to peer file sharing, and exceptions to anti-circumvention rules. It considers several options nations may have to respond to intellectual property arbitrages, none of which is likely to be very effective.
of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development."
6 That significant variations in national laws continue to exist a decade after TRIPS should not be surprising given the diversity of countries' social, economic, and legal traditions, stages of development, and cultures. 7 Nations have incentives to adopt higher-protection rules when an already innovative domestic sector demonstrates a need for stronger rules to enable firms to recoup R&D investments, or when nations believe that doing so will spur investments and economic development in that field of innovation. 8 Nations have incentives to adopt lower-protection rules if they are predominantly users or net importers of products of that kind, if they aspire to incentivize investments in follow-on innovation, or if they believe that a lower-protection rule will induce more investments than a higher-protection rule. 9 National differences in intellectual property rules may be unproblematic when the differing rules do not undermine domestic protections. If country A protects a certain innovation (say, patents for higher life forms) and country B does not, country A may be willing to accept that country B's rule is different as long as it can stop at the border any products from B that would infringe its nationals' IP rights. Firms can set up R&D facilities in country A and hope to recoup R&D expenses by exploiting the innovation in A's market. They have at least partial protection in the global market. 10 One country's decision to provide more extensive protection than TRIPS requires can provide large externalities for the rest of the world. Innovators may be able to recoup investments by selling products in the market where the high-protection rule applies, but cannot expect to have the same advantage in the world market. Protection in one or a small number of nations necessarily creates a voluntary outflow of profit from the country's own users to foreign innovators without a reciprocal inflow from foreign users to domestic investors. It is remarkable that some countries nevertheless do this. 6 TRIPS Arts. 7-8. 7 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Implications of the Agreement On Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights For Cultural Dimensions of National Copyright Laws, 23 J. Cultural Econ. 95 (1999) . 8 Higher protection rules may also be manifestations of public choice problems with IP legislation insofar as innovative industries are well-organized, well-funded, and well-situated to benefit significantly from higher-protection rules, making it reasonable to invest in legislation to increase protections to higher levels. Because of the distributed costs of higher-protection rules, collective action problems may prevent those who will bear those costs to organize effectively to block higher-protection legislation. 9 The EU was a net importer of software when it adopted the Council Directive 91/250 on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 1991 O.J. (L122) 42 (hereinafter "EU Software Directive") (establishing uniform protections for software in the EU). The EU hoped its rules would enable EU firms to engage in follow-on innovation by developing software that would interoperate with U.S. software. See But legal rules in foreign jurisdictions can sometimes limit the force of IP rights in the domestic country. That is, sometimes country B's decision not to protect an innovation, or to protect it less strongly than A, has spillover effects for country A. Country B's decision may, moreover, attract domestic and foreign investments. As Part II will show, country A may not always be able to control entry of products developed in country B from entering its market. Unless country A can persuade all nations to harmonize on its higher-protection rule, a lower-protection rule in even one jurisdiction may undermine A's rule. Innovators may either have protection everywhere (because A persuaded all nations to adopt its rule) or effectively nowhere (because the lowerprotection rule undermines A's rule). This is the IP arbitrage issue on which this Article is principally focused.
That differences in national intellectual property rules can affect arbitrage is easily illustrated.
11 Australia currently facilitates arbitrage by permitting the importation of certain IP products (for example, CDs of recorded music) from countries where these products can be purchased at a lower price (say, Thailand) than the recording industry wishes to be the prevailing price in Australia; the arbitrageurs' competition reduces the local authorized sellers' rents. The U.S. has put pressure on Australia to ban such parallel imports.
12 Because no consensus exists about whether national exhaustion of rights 13 (the rule preferred by U.S. trade officials) or international exhaustion (the Australian preferred rule) is the "best" rule, 14 the negotiations leading up to TRIPS did not resolve the international debate on this particular type of IP arbitrage. 15 If national approaches to the exhaustion of rights issue differ, arbitrages will occur.
The IP arbitrages that are the main focus of this article resemble classic arbitrages in that they impair the ability to maintain a higher-protection rule (or higher price) in one location because market participants can take advantage of a lower-protection rule (or lower price) elsewhere. Other nations (say, the European Union) may allow software reverse engineering for interoperability purposes and refuse to enforce license restrictions on reverse engineering.
19 Such a rule may promote competition and follow-on innovation in its domestic software market.
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Foreign developers who obtain U.S. software can reverse engineer it in the EU to make compatible products. The resulting software may be marketed in U.S. as well as European markets as long as the compatible software does not infringe U.S. copyrights.
21
The lower-protection European rule would create incentives for U.S.-based software developers, as well as EU developers, to set up reverse engineering facilities in the EU for development of compatible products.
Thus, a foreign rule in favor of reverse engineering may foil a domestic strategy in favor of protecting platforms with proprietary interfaces. The domestic rule enforcing anti-reverse engineering license terms may just shift development offshore--disadvantaging certain domestic innovators but perhaps increasing competition and ongoing innovation.
B.
Products If a bio-engineered research tool is patented in one nation (say, the U.S.), but not in other countries, 22 the patentee may find it difficult to control commercially valuable uses of the tools not only in the markets where no patent has issued, but even in the market where it was patented.
The main utility of bio-engineered research tools is in developing bio-engineered products, such as drugs or enzymes. If a foreign national obtains a U.S. patented bioengineered research tool and uses it outside of the U.S. to develop a commercial drug, the foreign firm can sell the drug developed with the research tool not only in foreign markets where it is patented, but also in the U.S. market. While the U.S. has forbidden importation of products made outside the U.S. covered by a U.S. patented process since 1988, 23 it does not forbid importation of products made outside the U.S. with U.S. patented products. 24 Thus, the domestic protection of research tools may only shift their use to other countries. The tool's proprietor may effectively have no protection, as the tool is unlikely to be used where it is protected. The lack of protection in even one nation may be tantamount to a lack of protection everywhere in the world.
25
C.
Country Codes
Developers of computer games may try to enhance their profits by embedding country or region codes so that their games will only play on platforms embedded with the same code. This allows game-makers to sell the same product at different prices in different countries.
Some countries (say, the U.S.) may outlaw circumvention of technical measures, such as country codes, on the theory that strict rules against circumvention will protect . 24 See, e.g., Bayer AG v. Housey Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 340 F.3d 1367, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that sec. 271(g) applies only to importation of physical goods, not importation of data); Amgen, Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 902 F.2d 1532, 1538-40 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (refusing to stop importation of artificial hormone made abroad using U.S.-patented cells, because cells are a "product" rather than a "process"). 25 Another type of IP arbitrage arising out of differing patent rules may occur when some countries embrace, and others deny, research exceptions to patent infringement. Follow-on innovators may decide to establish R&D facilities in countries with such exceptions. Otherwise-infringing research may result in the development of noninfringing new products, which may then be imported to compete with the patentee and its licensees. Exempting research and experimental uses of inventions from the scope of the patent right has achieved considerable acceptance in the international community. See game developers from "piracy" (that is, widespread infringement). 26 Foreign jurisdictions (say, Finland) might adopt weaker anti-circumvention rules-for example, allowing purchasers of digital products to bypass country codes so they can play games on a platform of their choice 27 -on the ground that country coding (and concomitant price discrimation) is anti-competitive. 28 A weaker anti-circumvention rule in Finland may undermine the game-makers' price discrimination strategy. Insofar as global digital networks permit nationals of a lower-protection jurisdiction to disseminate technologies designed to enable bypassing of country codes or information about how to bypass country codes, the game-maker's price discrimination could be undermined worldwide. 29 The welfare effects of IP arbitrages that undermine price discrimination are unclear. Price discrimination can, of course, enhance consumer welfare by increasing the total number of users; overall use of an IP product may fall if producer's price discrimination regime collapses. 30 However, price discrimination in IP markets is not always benign, 31 and TRIPS contemplates that nations can prevent abuses of IP rights.
32
Country coding achieves technologically what national exhaustion of rights rules would otherwise achieve, and if nations under TRIPS are free to adopt international exhaustion rules, they should also have discretion to adopt anti-circumvention rules to achieve the same objective. Peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing technologies are widely used to exchange digital music in the MP3 file format.
33 Downloading digital music without paying for it, as P2P technology permits, may constitute copyright infringement. 34 While developers of P2P software are typically not directly liable, the recording industry has charged P2P developers with indirect copyright infringement on various theories.
35
P2P technology creates another IP arbitrage opportunity. Suppose courts in country A (say, the U.S.) decide that makers of such technologies are indirect infringers, 36 but courts in country B (say, the Netherlands) decide that they are not because of substantial non-infringing uses of these technologies. 37 Courts in country A cannot enforce a judgment against a foreign maker of P2P technologies in the absence of domestic assets; furthermore, enjoining the foreign P2P developer will fail to stop domestic users from accessing the technology from foreign sites via the Internet.
38
The principal result of national differences on indirect copyright liability rules may be to shift development of P2P technologies offshore. 39 The development and distribution of P2P technologies will not stop unless they are banned in all countries. 38 See, e.g., Burk, supra note 11, at 960 ("[B]ecause of the Internet, interdiction of infringing products may become nearly impossible."). 39 This helps to explain why some P2P developers have moved their headquarters to remote locations. See Wu, supra note 37, at 736 (noting that KaZaa's parent company is incorporated in Vanuatu, while Grokster's servers are located in Nevis). 40 Highly decentralized software systems may continue to be used even if developers have shut down their operations. See Grokster, 259 F.Supp.2d at 1045 ("Defendants provide software that communicates across networks that are entirely outside Defendants [sic] control. In the case of Grokster, the network is the propriety [sic] FastTrack network, which is clearly not controlled by Defendant Grokster. In the case of StreamCast, the network is Gnutella, the open-source nature of which apparently places it outside the control of any single entity.")(emphasis in original). Another example of IP arbitrage involving digital copyrights is the streaming of digital content that is unlawful in one jurisdiction (say, the U.S.) but lawful in another (say, Canada); streaming services could locate servers in Canada, but attract U.S. residents who access the streamed content via the Internet, thereby creating an arbitrage. One effort to exploit differences in national rules about streaming digital content resulted in the higher-protection rule prevailing over the lower-protection rule. See, e.g., Gerry Blackwell, iCrave Just a Hint of Things to Come, Toronto Star (March 9, 2000)(describing the shuttering of Canadian web rebroadcasting service iCrave in response to lawsuits filed by U.S. copyright owners alleging violation of U.S. copyright law).
E. Factors Affecting IP Arbitrages
A foreign rules' undermining of domestic protection via IP arbitrages is not inevitable. IP arbitrages are less likely if they involve physical goods that must be transported in a traditional manner (for example, by ships, trucks, or airplanes) such that infringements can readily be detected by examining the goods at the border. Information technologies are more susceptible to IP arbitrages owing to their more intangible nature, the relative invisibility of key innovations they embody, and the ease of transmitting many of them via the Internet. 41 Derivative innovations that do not bear the imprint of infringement in the product being distributed (say, drugs made with the aid of research tools) are also more susceptible to IP arbitrages.
III. Possible Responses to IP Arbitrages and Attendant Difficulties
A nation that objects to an IP arbitrage that undermines its domestic policy has several options. First, it can change its domestic law to broaden import controls or expand the extraterritorial reach of its domestic law. Second, it can pressure the "rogue" nation to synchronize rules. Third, it can initiate a complaint against the other nation under the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) of the TRIPS Agreement. Fourth, it can propose amendments to the TRIPS Agreement to achieve a finer degree of harmonization of minimum standards. Fifth, it can close off trade or communication to protect its domestic rules. Sixth, it can accept that some IP arbitrage may be inevitable and adjust its expectations about the benefits it will be able to derive from TRIPS. Various difficulties attend each option. None is likely to be a foolproof solution to IP arbitrages.
A. Enhancing Domestic Protections
An obvious step for a nation to take in response to IP arbitrages is to amend domestic laws to block that arbitrage. As to products made elsewhere from research tools patented domestically, for example, a nation could ban importation of products made with the aid of domestically patented research tools. As to interoperable software, a nation could change its copyright laws to prohibit importation of computer programs developed in violation of a mass-market license outside that nation. Also possible is legislation authorizing an expansion of the extraterritorial reach of domestic law.
One precedent for expanding domestic law to stop IP arbitrage is Section 271(g) of the U.S. patent law, which forbids the importation and sale of products made from processes patented in the U.S. 42 This provision's potential to disrupt domestic businesses sparked controversy when initially proposed. Retailers not only "feared [the abuse of] extended process patent protection…to harass sellers of products legitimately produced by noninfringing processes" abroad, but also faced liability for selling imported products while unaware of infringing processes by which they were made-a liability that might 41 See, e.g., Burk, supra note 11, at 944-45. 42 35 U.S.C. sec. 271(g). have extended to "unwitting" downstream purchasers. 43 To address these concerns, Congress limited the reach of Section 271(g) by shielding noncommercial uses and retail sales, 44 and exempted products materially changed by subsequent processes and products that are trivial components of other products. 45 Similar resistance may arise if nations try to ban importation of products of research tools, unlicensed interoperable software, or the like-especially if domestic support for the stronger-protection rule is weak or equivocal. For example, even if software developers, such as Microsoft, would support amendments to U.S. copyright law favoring enforcement of license restrictions on reverse engineering of software, such amendments would be opposed by other firms, such as Sun Microsystems, that support reverse engineering. 46 Thus, internal domestic politics may check a nation's efforts to avoid IP arbitrage by expanding the scope of domestic legal protections.
Nations can also extend the extraterritorial reach of domestic IP law. 47 U.S. courts regularly invoke a presumption that U.S. laws have no extraterritorial application unless Congress has expressly so provided. 48 That Congress has not yet done so is notable given how much harm U.S. firms claim from foreign infringements. 49 Even assuming their enforceability against non-residents, extending the reach of domestic IP laws extraterritorially may subvert foreign policy. 50 In sum, domestic and foreign policy considerations are likely to constrain the ability of a nation to avoid IP arbitrage by amending domestic laws to broaden import controls or to extend the reach of its laws beyond its territorial boundaries. Moreover, banning the import of derivatives, such as products of research tools or products of patented processes, may be difficult to enforce, particularly when the products do not bear the imprint of the infringement and there is more than one way to make them. 51 
B.
Putting Pressure On the "Rogue" Nation Nations affected by an IP arbitrage may also pressure the other nation to change its law. There is, of course, nothing new about unilateral pressure as a strategy for dealing with perceived inadequacies of other nations' IP laws or practices. 52 Many expected TRIPS \ to cause such pressure to subside, 53 and some have argued that it is inconsistent with TRIPS obligations for member states to engage in unilateral retribution as to matters covered by the TRIPS Agreement. 54 The U.S. has been the most active and aggressive user of unilateral pressure to induce changes in other nation's IP laws. Prior to the adoption of TRIPS, the U.S. implemented procedures for taking action against nations having IP policies it deems deficient. The U.S. Trade Representative has authority to investigate whether particular nations adequately protect IP rights and if not, to deny them trade benefits unless their policies change. 55 It publishes an annual report assigning a level of priority to the perceived inadequacies of other nations' laws and takes prompt action against priority violators. 56 The U.S. has used these procedures to put considerable pressure on other nations to change their IP policies both before and after TRIPS. 57 Yet unilateral pressure may be founder against some trading partners and as to some issues, depending on the clout of the beneficiaries of the foreign low-protection rules. For example, the EU has insisted on the U.S. adopting stricter rules about geographical origin designations for wine, while the U.S. has demanded that the EU broaden the availability of patents for biotechnology inventions. 58 Neither bilateral negotiations nor TRIPS fully resolved these differences. If the U.S. responded to an IP arbitrage as to interoperable software, the EU would almost certainly resist changes to its policy against enforcement of license restrictions on reverse engineering given how deliberately the EU developed its Directive on the Legal Protection for Computer Programs to enable competition and innovation in the software industry. 59 Less powerful nations have sometimes repulsed U.S. efforts to promote higherprotection rules, notably those affecting developing countries' access to essential medicines. The U.S. put considerable pressure on South Africa and Brazil to prevent them from adopting a compulsory licensing scheme for AIDS drugs to which the pharmaceutical industry objected. 60 Counter-pressures, however, arose from alliances among developing countries with similar concerns, non-governmental organizations concerned with health policy, and a global publicity campaign focusing on the effects of restricting access to essential medicines. 61 The U.S. eventually backed off, although access to essential medicines remains a hotly contested issue. 62 Unilateral pressure also undermines incentives for voluntary compliance with TRIPS. 63 If nations experience equally relentless unilateral pressure after TRIPS as before it, they may believe they have been denied a key benefit of the bargain they believed they struck when agreeing to TRIPS. 64 
C.
Filing a Complaint with the WTO Nations aggrieved about an IP arbitrage may file a complaint alleging that another WTO member state's low-protection rule violates the TRIPS Agreement. 65 A WTO member state may file a "violation complaint" if another WTO member state has adopted a measure impairing or nullifying a TRIPS obligation, or a "non-violation complaint" if "a member state asserts that any objective of the Agreement is being impeded as a result of any measure applied by another member state, whether or not it conflicts with the [TRIPS] Agreement." 66 The complainant's burden is easier to meet in violation cases: breach of a TRIPS obligation is presumed harmful. 67 To win a non-violation case, by contrast, "the complaining party must demonstrate not only that it suffered a trade injury but that it was justified in relying on the nonoccurrence of that measure or event." 68 There is presently a "working understanding" that non-violation complaints should not be filed. 69 Challenging the IP arbitrages, such as those discussed in Part II, as a direct violation of TRIPS will, however, be difficult because they do not involve TRIPS minima. 70 These arbitrages also involve new technology issues as to which there may be no established international norm for the dispute panel to apply. 71 Even if the moratorium on non-violation complaints eventually lapses, winning a non-violation complaint would be difficult because of the need to prove both harm and reliance on the other's forbearance from adopting the low-protection rule. Thus, concerns posed by IP arbitrages may be difficult to resolve through the WTO dispute process.
D. Proposing More Detailed Harmonization
Nations affected by IP arbitrages may propose that the TRIPS Agreement be amended to incorporate additional, more detailed minimum standards.
72 Amending TRIPS to increase the level of IP protection required of WTO members will, however, not be easy. 73 Article 71(2) provides that TRIPS may be amended to adjust member state obligations to higher levels of protections when such norms have been "accepted under [other multilateral] agreements by all members of the WTO," after which they can be referred "to the Ministerial Conference for action …on the basis of a consensus proposal from the Council for TRIPS."
74 Negotiations leading up to new multilateral agreements may take many years.
There are several reasons to believe that proposing more detailed TRIPS minima to overcome IP arbitrage would encounter resistance. The lower-protection nation can be expected to oppose any proposal to override its domestic rule. Insofar as that nation could articulate a pro-competition, pro-innovation, or other policy-based rationale for its rule, it may well win support from other nations. 75 Even if the contested measure does not directly impact developing countries, they may ally with the lower-protection nation to fend off more fine-grained harmonization. Proposing new harmonized standards would, moreover, open up opportunities for bargaining and concessions that proponents of higher-protection rules might ultimately find very costly. 76 Finally, the norms in TRIPS will almost inevitably be at a sufficiently high level of abstraction that more than one interpretation of the norms will be plausible. No matter how detailed TRIPS minima become, ambiguities and differing interpretations will 75 See Part II (giving examples of competition, innovation, and consumer protection rationales for lowerprotection rules that make IP arbitrage possible). 76 See, e.g., Gerhart, supra note 64, at 360 (noting that new rounds of negotiations for higher levels of protection under TRIPS may create new opportunities and incentives for developing countries to exaggerate the costs of compliance and insist on new concessions). almost certainly persist, especially given that the emergence of new technologies so frequently poses interpretive challenges for existing norms.
E. Choosing Isolation
Nations affected by an IP arbitrage may also isolate themselves from the global trading community or the Internet so that IP arbitrage cannot occur. 77 Alternatively, nations can adopt much more restrictive border control measures or build an elaborate firewall to impede Internet communications deemed objectionable.
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But isolationism entails considerable costs. An underlying premise of TRIPS and other WTO Agreements is that international trade is a net positive for member states, their nationals, and the world economy. Self-imposed embargos, virtual or real, prevent domestic firms from accessing goods and services that may be important to domestic industrial capabilities. 79 They also dampen prospects for foreign investment. Moreover, developing more extensive border controls or building firewalls will be expensive, with cost rising with restrictiveness. 80 The costs of isolation are likely to be so substantial as to make this option infeasible for most nations.
F.
Accepting IP Arbitrage
It is, of course, possible for nations confronted with an IP arbitrage to simply accept that the arbitrage has occurred and that their rule is infeasible to enforce. In some cases, nations can resort to other mechanisms for enabling domestic innovators to obtain resources necessary to support R&D in the particular field. For example, public funding for the development of research tools may provide adequate incentives for the development of such tools, obviating the need for patents to serve this function. 81 
IV.
Conclusion TRIPS has not eliminated economic incentives for nations to adopt, depending on their domestic circumstances, higher-or lower-protection rules. Innovators in nations with higher-protection rules will often, but not always, be able to enjoy at least partial protection in that nation's market. A lower-protection foreign rule will sometimes 77 Only North Korea and Myanmur have chosen not to connect to the Internet. See Froomkin, supra note 16, at 144. 78 See id. at 144-46 (describing Vietnamese, Singaporean, and Chinese efforts to control Internet access). 79 See id. at 146.
The tighter the filter, the greater the opportunity cost in lost ability to access the rest off [sic] the world's data….In order for such a strategy to have any hope of success, [] the government must be prepared to risk domestic pressure, pressure from abroad, and especially pressure from foreign firms with local offices that, like those established in Singapore, are likely to protest loudly at having their data and communications monitored. Id. 80 See id. 81 See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 51, at 165-75 (discussing government policy with respect to publicly funded research since 1980). undermine a higher-protection domestic rule by creating incentives to shift the locus of economic activity to the less protective jurisdiction. Nations affected by IP arbitrages may encounter difficulties when responding either by adjustments to national rules or by action in the international arena.
Whether IP arbitrages are consistent with TRIPS depends on one's viewpoint. Under a very broad interpretation of TRIPS, 82 IP arbitrages seem inconsistent with TRIPS because they frustrate its objective to enable innovators to recoup R&D investments on a global basis. 83 Yet, if one takes the broad view seriously, the most appropriate responses to IP arbitrages would be either to file a WTO complaint or propose amendments to TRIPS. A WTO complaint would be unlikely to succeed as long as the working moratorium on non-violation complaints persists. Unilateral pressure or expansion of the scope of domestic law or its territorial reach may be much more likely to succeed than a WTO complaint or a proposal to amend TRIPS, but these measures would be inconsistent with broadly conceived multilateral obligations.
Under a narrow view, 84 TRIPS allows nations broad discretion to adopt locally appropriate rules to promote domestic development objectives. Because some nations will have incentives to adopt higher-protection rules and others lower-protection rules, IP arbitrages may be the inevitable result of economic forces playing themselves out in the global arena. But if TRIPS obligations are truly minimal, it may be fair game for nations with higher-protection rules to exert pressure on nations with low-protection rules or to extend the scope of domestic protection or territorial reach of domestic laws in an attempt to restore partial protection, given the futility of filing a WTO complaint or proposing more detailed harmonization.
If neither the broad nor the narrow view of TRIPS is indisputable, it is perhaps understandable that nations with higher-protection rules would both interpret TRIPS very broadly and also continue to pressure nations with less protective rules to change them, and that developing nations would both view TRIPS narrowly and yet also object to pressure on them into adopting higher-protection rules. 85 depending on their economic effects.
86 IP arbitrages are a manifestation of competition among higher-and lower-protectionist rules in the global economy; a higher-protection rule may sometimes be necessary to create adequate incentives for particular classes of innovation, and sometimes not. If lower-protection rules promoting research uses, interoperability, the public domain, and related values are economically sound, then as long as at least one nation adopts them, beneficiaries may include not only residents of the adopting nation, but those of other nations that can obtain access to products via the Internet or through the normal operation of international trade. 87 For those concerned that very strong IP rules are impeding innovation, competition, and other societal goals, 88 as well as for those who believe that "user rights" should become part of the TRIPS agenda, 89 IP arbitrages may provide some good news.
